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OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
Binyamin Stimler, Jay Goldstein, and Mendel Epstein 
are Orthodox Jewish rabbis who were charged with various 
kidnapping-related offenses, stemming from their 
involvement in a scheme through which they, along with 
others,1 sought to assist Orthodox Jewish women to obtain 
divorces from recalcitrant husbands.  After a jury trial, all 
three defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit 
kidnapping.  The defendants now appeal various rulings made 
by the District Court before, during, and after trial.  Because 
we find no merit in any of the defendants’ arguments, we will 
affirm all three convictions. 
                                              
1 The other rabbis associated with the ring were variously 1) 
charged but pled guilty, 2) went to trial and were acquitted, or 
3) had their charges dismissed by the government.  Stimler, 
Goldstein, and Epstein were the only three to be convicted 
after trial. 
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I2 
 In the Orthodox Jewish tradition, a married woman 
cannot obtain a religious divorce until her husband provides 
her with a contract called a “get” (pluralized as “gittin”), 
which must, in turn, be signed by an “eid,” or witness.  A 
woman who attempts to leave her husband without obtaining 
a get becomes an “agunah” (pluralized as “agunot”), which 
subjects her to severe social ostracism within the Orthodox 
Jewish community.  Agunot may seek relief in a “beth din,” a 
rabbinical court presided over by a panel of three rabbis.  The 
beth din may then issue “psak kefiah,” or contempt orders 
authorizing sanctions, which include, but are not limited to, 
the use of force against a husband to secure a get.  To assist 
an agunah to obtain a get is a “mitzvah,” or religious 
commandment of the Orthodox Jewish faith.  Starting in at 
least 2009, Stimler, Epstein, and Goldstein participated in the 
beth din process to help agunot obtain gittin.  They worked 
with “tough guys” or “muscle men” in exchange for money to 
kidnap and torture husbands in order to coerce them to sign 
the gittin. 
 
 In 2013, the FBI learned of the kidnapping ring and 
began investigating the rabbis.  As part of this investigation, 
an FBI agent posed as an agunah and approached Epstein.  
The agent met with Epstein at his home in New Jersey.  
Epstein suggested that kidnapping would be appropriate in 
the agent’s “situation,” promising that “what we’re doing is 
                                              
2 As all three defendants were convicted, the facts and 
evidence are taken in the light most favorable to the 
government.  United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 93 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
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basically gonna be kidnapping a guy for a couple of hours and 
beatin’ him up and torturing him . . ..”3  One month after this 
meeting, Epstein and Goldstein found a potential location for 
the kidnapping.  Epstein then convened a beth din at which 
he, Goldstein, and a third rabbi presided.  Together, the rabbis 
issued a psak kefiah authorizing the use of force against the 
agent’s “husband.”  Epstein and the agent subsequently 
planned the details, including the date, location, and manner 
of the kidnapping of the “husband.”  On the day of the 
kidnapping, a team of rabbis and “tough guys” assembled at 
the agreed-upon location.  Goldstein and Stimler arrived in 
disguise and Stimler conducted counter-surveillance of the 
area. 
 
 Once the kidnapping team had assembled, the FBI 
arrested them.  Epstein and Stimler were each charged with 
one substantive kidnapping count, one count of attempted 
kidnapping, and one count of conspiracy to commit 
kidnapping.  Goldstein was charged with two substantive 
kidnapping counts, one count of attempted kidnapping, and 
one count of conspiracy. 
 
 During its preparation for trial, the government applied 
for a court order, pursuant to Section 2703(d) of the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA), compelling AT&T to turn over 
historic cell site location information (CSLI) generated by 
Goldstein’s phone.  CSLI is generated every time a cell phone 
user sends or receives a call or text message; when the call or 
message is routed through the nearest cell tower, the user’s 
service provider generates and retains a record identifying the 
particular tower through which the communication was 
                                              
3 JA 4654. 
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routed.4  In more densely populated areas, cell towers are able 
to triangulate an individual’s approximate location based on 
the individual’s distance from the three nearest towers.  Thus, 
while less precise than traditional GPS systems, historic CSLI 
records can nonetheless generate a rough profile of an 
individual’s approximate movements based on the phone calls 
that individual makes over a period of time.  The order for 
such records, covering a total of 57 days of Goldstein’s 
location history, was issued by a magistrate judge on October 
30, 2014. 
 
II 
 The defendants filed numerous pretrial motions before 
the District Court; we consider only the three which are 
relevant to this appeal.  First, Goldstein moved to suppress 
the CSLI obtained pursuant to the SCA, arguing that cell 
phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such 
metadata, implicating the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  The District Court denied Goldstein’s motion, 
reasoning that collection of CSLI “does not involve physical 
intrusion upon [Goldstein’s] property or any real time 
tracking information” and did not “concern the search or 
seizure of a cell phone, or the content of any 
communication.”5   
 
Second, all three defendants sought dismissal of the 
indictment pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), arguing that the government’s decision to prosecute 
                                              
4 United States v. Epstein (Epstein II), No. 14 CR 287, 2015 
WL 1646838, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2015). 
5 Epstein II, 2015 WL 1646838, at *3. 
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them substantially burdened their sincerely held religious 
beliefs and was not the least restrictive means of furthering 
any compelling government interest.  Stimler raised the 
additional argument that RFRA required him to be severed 
from the trial of Epstein and Goldstein.  The District Court 
rejected these arguments, finding that the government’s 
decision to prosecute the defendants did not substantially 
burden their religious exercise.6  In the alternative, the 
District Court found that the government had a compelling 
interest in the uniform prosecution of kidnapping laws and 
that the prosecution of the defendants was the least restrictive 
way of achieving that interest.7  The District Court summarily 
rejected Stimler’s request for severance, reasoning that the 
joint prosecution was not a substantial burden and that 
“[t]here is nothing in [RFRA] which suggests that it can be 
used to argue for severance.”8 
 
Third, the defendants sought to introduce evidence of 
their religious beliefs and, more broadly, of Orthodox Jewish 
law in order to negate the motive element of the kidnapping 
statute, or, in the alternative, to demonstrate consent on the 
part of the husbands.  The District Court refused to admit 
such evidence, finding that it was irrelevant both to motive 
and to the affirmative defense of consent.  In the alternative, 
the District Court held that the evidence would be unduly 
prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
                                              
6 United States v. Epstein (Epstein I), 91 F. Supp. 3d 573, 
582-83 (D.N.J. 2015). 
7 Id. at 584-85. 
8 Id. at 588. 
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as it “would carry a significant potential for jury 
nullification.”9 
 
 At trial, the government introduced a variety of 
evidence against the defendants.  As relevant here, the 
government introduced testimony from FBI agents placing 
Stimler and Goldstein at the site of the proposed kidnapping 
in a disguise.  The agents stated that Stimler performed 
counter-surveillance at the site.  The government also 
introduced the statements made about Goldstein by another 
rabbi at a beth din convened to determine the validity of a get 
obtained from one of the prior kidnappings.  After both the 
government and the defense rested, the judge instructed the 
jury as to the elements of each charged offense and 
sequestered the jury for deliberations.  On the fourth day of 
deliberations, the jury sent a question to the judge, inquiring 
whether failure to intervene could make an individual liable 
for kidnapping.  The judge wrote back that, having interpreted 
the question to refer only to the substantive kidnapping 
counts, the answer was no.  The defendants objected to this 
response, arguing that it implied that failure to intervene 
could support a conviction for the attempt and conspiracy 
charges. 
 
 All three defendants were convicted.  Stimler was 
sentenced to 39 months incarceration, Goldstein to 96 
months, and Epstein to 120 months.  They appealed.  We 
consolidated the appeals for disposition. 
                                              
9 Id. at 597. 
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III10 
 This appeal presents eight issues, not all of which 
apply to every defendant.  As such, we treat each issue in 
turn, and note which defendants have raised which claims. 
 
A. 
We first address whether the District Court erred in 
denying Goldstein’s11 motion to suppress the CSLI evidence.  
Because the parties agree as to all the relevant facts and 
dispute only the legal implications thereof, our review is 
plenary.12  Section 2703 of the SCA authorizes the 
government to “require a provider of electronic 
communication service . . . to disclose a record or other 
                                              
10 The District Court had jurisdiction over the criminal 
prosecutions of the three defendants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction over the defendants’ appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
11 To the extent Epstein also seeks to challenge the District 
Court’s denial of the motion to suppress, he lacks standing to 
do so because it does not appear that the government obtained 
any CSLI about his whereabouts.  See United States v. Nagle, 
803 F.3d 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Fourth Amendment rights 
are personal rights which, like some other constitutional 
rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”) (quoting Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). 
12 United States v. Lafferty, 503 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“We . . . exercise plenary review as to [a suppression 
motion’s] legality in light of the [district] court’s properly 
found facts.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such 
service . . . when the governmental entity . . . obtains a court 
order for such disclosure . . ..”13  Such a court order “shall 
issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe” that the records “are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”14  Notably, this “reasonable 
grounds” requirement is a lesser burden than the “probable 
cause” requirement of the Fourth Amendment.15 
 
Recognizing that the SCA permits precisely what the 
government here did, Goldstein argues that the SCA violates 
the Fourth Amendment insofar as it authorizes the 
government to require disclosure of historic CSLI without 
obtaining a warrant.  To the extent that historic CSLI records 
allow the government to aggregate an individual’s movement 
history over an indefinite period of time, Goldstein argues 
that the Supreme Court has suggested that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in such information.  In the 
alternative, Goldstein asserts that the government failed to 
meet even the relaxed “reasonable grounds” requirement of 
the SCA.  In response to Goldstein’s constitutional argument, 
                                              
13 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(B).  The parties do not dispute that cell 
site location information is a record “pertaining to” the user 
of a cell phone. 
14 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
15 In re Application of the United States for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to 
Disclose Records to the Government (In re Application), 620 
F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he standard [of reasonable 
grounds] is an intermediate one that is less stringent than 
probable cause.”). 
12 
 
the government rests primarily on the third-party doctrine,16 
arguing that cell phone users voluntarily turn over CSLI to 
their service providers.  With respect to Goldstein’s statutory 
arguments, the government maintains that the detailed 
descriptions of prior kidnappings allegedly committed and the 
identification of specific periods of interest provided 
“reasonable grounds” for disclosure.  
 
We do not decide these questions on a blank slate.  
Both parties agree that our decision in In re Application of the 
United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic 
Communication Service to Disclose Records to the 
Government (In re Application) addresses the same issues 
presented in this appeal.  In In re Application, we rejected the 
applicability of the third-party doctrine to CSLI, holding that 
the transmission of CSLI was not truly voluntary.17  We went 
on to conclude, however, that the SCA’s disclosure regime 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because individuals 
lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI.18 
Pursuant to our Internal Operating Procedures, “the 
holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on 
                                              
16 The third-party doctrine precludes defendants from 
asserting any privacy interests in information which they 
voluntarily disclose to third parties.  United States v. Christie, 
624 F.3d 558, 573-74 (3d Cir. 2010). 
17 In re Application, 620 F.3d at 317. 
18 Id. at 312-13 (explaining that CSLI does not implicate an 
individual’s privacy interests because such interests “are 
confined to the interior of the home” and holding that “CSLI 
from cell phone calls is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order 
and that such an order does not require the traditional 
probable cause determination”). 
13 
 
subsequent panels.”19  Thus, as a general matter, we remain 
obliged to follow our precedent absent en banc 
reconsideration.  A narrow exception to this rule exists, 
however, where intervening legal developments have 
undercut the decisional rationale of our precedent.20  We have 
described this as an exacting standard; we generally will not 
decline to follow our precedent unless it “no longer has any 
vitality”21 or is “patently inconsistent”22 with subsequent legal 
developments.  Because In re Application has not been 
overturned by this Court sitting en banc, we will continue to 
follow it in its entirety unless the government demonstrates 
that intervening legal developments have undermined In re 
Application’s rejection of the third-party doctrine or 
Goldstein can demonstrate that intervening changes in the law 
have created a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI.  
We conclude that neither the government nor Goldstein have 
met their respective burdens. 
 
1. 
We begin with the government’s contention that 
individuals voluntarily convey CSLI to their cell service 
                                              
19 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1. 
20 See, e.g., In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A 
panel of this Court may reevaluate the holding of a prior 
panel which conflicts with intervening Supreme Court 
precedent.” (citations omitted)). 
21 West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis 
added). 
22 United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 627 (3d Cir. 
1975)). 
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providers.  The government attempts to sidestep In re 
Application by characterizing its rejection of the third-party 
doctrine as dictum.  However, the government placed the 
issue of the third-party doctrine squarely before us in In re 
Application by arguing that the doctrine prevented CSLI from 
ever implicating Fourth Amendment concerns.  We explicitly 
considered and rejected this argument, reasoning that “[a] cell 
phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location 
information with a cellular provider in any meaningful 
way.”23  We noted, however, that § 2703(c) offers the judge 
the option of requiring probable cause before CSLI is 
released.24  By holding that magistrate judges presented with 
requests for § 2703(d) orders retain discretion under § 
2703(c) to “mak[e] a judgment about the possibility that such 
disclosure would implicate the Fourth Amendment,”25 we 
necessarily rejected the third-party doctrine.  Had the 
government been correct that CSLI records were records 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties, CSLI could never 
implicate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
and thus would never be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.  Thus, the rejection of the 
third-party doctrine was necessary to the holding of In re 
Application. 
 
The government suggests, nevertheless, that this Court 
“should join all of its sister circuits” in applying the third-
party doctrine to CSLI,26 apparently arguing that the 
                                              
23 In re Application, 620 F.3d at 317. 
24 Id. at 319. 
25 Id. at 317. 
26 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
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subsequent decisions of other circuits may constitute 
intervening legal authority allowing departure from our 
precedent.  We have never so held, and we decline to do so 
now.  To the contrary, in declining to follow our decisions, 
we have recognized intervening authority only from the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Congress, or 
administrative agencies.27  Accordingly, we continue to 
adhere to our view, espoused in In re Application, that the 
third-party doctrine does not apply because cell phone users 
do not voluntarily disclose CSLI to their service providers 
simply by signing a service contract.28 
 
2. 
We next address whether intervening changes in law 
undermine In re Application’s holding that CSLI does not 
implicate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Goldstein argues that the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decisions in Riley v. California29 and United States v. Jones30 
                                              
27 See, e.g., Baptiste v. Attorney Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 609 n.8 
(3d Cir. 2016) (noting that “an intervening Supreme Court 
decision . . . is also a ‘sufficient basis’ for us to reevaluate our 
precedent” even without en banc review); United States v. 
Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “a panel 
may reevaluate a precedent in light of intervening authority 
and amendments to statutes and regulations”). 
28 For these reasons, to the extent that sections of the District 
Court opinion may be read to suggest that the third-party 
doctrine applies here, those sections are reversed.  See, e.g., 
Epstein II, 2015 WL 1646838, at *3. 
29 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
30 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
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render the underpinnings of In re Application untenable, and 
warrant a departure from our precedent.  In Goldstein’s view, 
Riley and Jones, taken together, strongly imply that an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or 
her aggregated movements over a period of time, particularly 
where cell phones are involved. 
 
We are not persuaded by Goldstein’s readings of Riley 
and Jones.  In Riley, the Supreme Court held that officers’ 
warrantless search of data stored on an individual’s cell phone 
ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment, noting that the diversity 
and quantity of data stored on mobile phones today created a 
reasonable expectation of privacy therein.31  However, Riley 
focused primarily on protecting the contents of cell phones, 
not metadata generated from cell phone usage.32  This 
distinction is far from trivial; Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has consistently protected only the contents of 
an individual’s communications.33  We recently emphasized 
this point in United States v. Stanley,34 rejecting the argument 
                                              
31 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95. 
32 Id. at 2489 (discussing the amount and variety of data 
stored on cell phones). 
33 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) 
(“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to 
and recording the petitioner’s words . . . constituted a ‘search 
and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) 
(emphasis added); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 
(1979) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in 
warrantless application of a pen register because “pen 
registers do not acquire the contents of communications”) 
(emphasis in original). 
34 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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that an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his or her IP address routed through a third party’s wireless 
router.  Even though we acknowledged that obtaining an 
individual’s IP address could roughly track his or her 
location, we reasoned that such records “revealed only the 
path of the signal establishing this connection [and] revealed 
nothing about the content of the data carried by that signal.”35  
Riley’s holding is thus an application of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of content.  Goldstein does not 
argue that the CSLI at issue here is content, nor would we 
find any such argument persuasive.36  Accordingly, Riley 
provides little support for extending Fourth Amendment 
protections to historic CSLI. 
 
Goldstein’s argument finds better support in the 
statements of the concurring opinions of Jones, in which the 
Supreme Court held that warrantless placement of a GPS 
tracker on an individual’s car for 28 days, and the resulting 
aggregated movement history, violated the Fourth 
Amendment.37  Although the majority rested on a trespass 
theory to reach this conclusion, five justices—in two separate 
concurrences—suggested that location tracking also 
                                              
35 Id. at 122. 
36 In the wake of Riley, we have adopted a flexible test for 
determining whether data is content or ancillary by analyzing 
whether the data is “part of the substantive information 
conveyed to the recipient,” noting that “location identifiers 
have classically been associated with non-content means of 
establishing communication.”  In re Google Inc. Cookie 
Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 136 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
37 Jones, 565 U.S. at 412-13. 
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implicated an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Justice Sotomayor, writing separately, expressed her view 
that the Fourth Amendment inquiry turns on “whether people 
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious 
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”38  Justice Alito’s 
concurrence, which was joined by three other justices, echoed 
this idea, focusing on “whether respondent’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term 
monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”39 
 
We do not believe that either concurrence in Jones has 
undercut In re Application in any meaningful way because of 
the different technologies at issue.  Jones dealt with GPS 
tracking, not historic CSLI.  In re Application expressly 
considered the differential accuracy of CSLI and GPS, 
holding that CSLI is less intrusive on individuals’ privacy 
rights than GPS tracking.  Jones made no suggestion that this 
holding was erroneous.   
 
Goldstein admits the inexact nature of CSLI.  He 
concedes that the tower which transmits the signal is 
generally, but not always, the tower closest to the cell phone.  
He further concedes that a phone may change from one tower 
to another nearby tower during a call without the phone 
having moved.  Because of the less precise nature of CSLI 
                                              
38 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
39 Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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data, we are not persuaded that CSLI is sufficiently similar to 
GPS to warrant departure from In re Application.40 
 
Goldstein’s reading of Jones suffers from another 
flaw; four of the five justices, who engaged in an analysis of 
whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their movements, expressly limited their consideration to 
areas in which Congress has not provided statutory 
protection.  Justice Alito’s concurrence noted that “[i]n 
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the 
best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”41  This, 
he explained, is because “[a] legislative body is well situated 
to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and 
to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive 
                                              
40 We do note some aspects of the testimony adduced at trial 
that suggest that the line between GPS tracking and CSLI 
records is blurring.  It appears that the government used CSLI 
to track Goldstein’s movement down various interstate 
highways between New York and New Jersey.  R. 3497a-
3502a.  The government’s expert explained that CSLI is no 
longer only generated at the beginning and end of each call, 
but at every point at which an individual moves closer to a 
different cell tower.  R. 3497a.    The government expert 
further stated that, given the density of cell towers in New 
York and New Jersey, CSLI generated there is relatively 
precise.  R. 3492a-94a.  Finally, the expert noted that CSLI 
records are generated far more frequently than they used to 
be, including when an individual sends text messages or uses 
certain applications.  R. 3531a-32a.   
41 Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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way.”42  Citing to the wiretapping statute as an example, 
Justice Alito stated that, where Congress strikes a particular 
balance between digital age privacy rights and government 
investigative interests, “regulation . . . has been governed 
primarily by statute and not by case law.”43  Justice Alito 
expressly warned against judicial creation of new privacy 
interests, cautioning that “judges are apt to confuse their own 
expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical 
reasonable person . . ..”44   
 
Here, Congress has expressly weighed the privacy 
rights in digital information against government interest in 
passing the SCA.45  Justice Alito’s concurrence suggests that 
we should be wary of revisiting this balance that Congress 
has struck.46 
 
Accordingly, Goldstein’s readings of Jones and Riley 
do not persuade us to reconsider our own precedent, nor do 
                                              
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 428. 
44 Id. at 427. 
45 In re Application, 620 F.3d at 313-15 (discussing the 
legislative history of the SCA).  Other circuits agree with this 
determination as well.  See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 
819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Congress has specifically 
legislated on the question . . . and in doing so has struck the 
balance reflected in the [SCA].”). 
46 Moreover, in view of the balance reflected by the statutory 
provisions for obtaining a court order under § 2703(d), we are 
particularly loathe to disregard the holding in In re 
Application based not on a direct holding of the Supreme 
Court, but on two cobbled together concurrences in Jones. 
21 
 
we see any independent reason to do so.  While the rapidly 
evolving nature of CSLI may one day give us a reason to 
reconsider the distinction between GPS and CSLI, we decline 
to do so today.  We continue to adhere to our view of In re 
Application:  the Fourth Amendment is not violated when the 
government has shown “reasonable grounds to believe that 
the . . . records . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”47  
 
3. 
 Goldstein argues, in the alternative, that the 
government failed to meet the “reasonable grounds” standard 
of the SCA.  As noted above, the “reasonable grounds” 
standard is a lesser burden than that of probable cause, and 
“in essence is a reasonable suspicion standard.”48  We thus 
look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
the government had a “particularized and objective basis” for 
believing that the CSLI would assist its investigation, mindful 
of the fact that agents are entitled “to draw on their own 
experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them . . ..”49   
 
                                              
47 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
48 United States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 351 (7th Cir. 2015); 
accord In re Application of the United States of America for 
an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 
283, 287 (4th Cir. 2013). 
49 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citations 
omitted). 
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 In light of this threshold, we find that the 
government’s application was more than satisfactory.  The 
government presented information about the kidnapping ring, 
the charged kidnappings, and the alleged involvement of each 
defendant.  In addition,, the government stated that another 
coconspirator had implicated the defendants in his statements 
to agents.50  The government then explained that its request 
was limited to CSLI records “during the time periods when 
the alleged kidnappings and attempted kidnappings occurred” 
in order to “identify the location of the alleged participants . . 
..”51  Collectively, this information provided the government 
with reasonable grounds to believe that the records would be 
relevant to their investigation.52 
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order 
denying suppression of the CSLI records obtained pursuant to 
the SCA. 
 
B. 
We next turn to the arguments raised by all three 
defendants that various aspects of the prosecution violated 
RFRA.  Because the motion implicates the proper scope of 
                                              
50 SA 9. 
51 Id. 
52 The government urges us to adopt a strict rule that 
suppression of evidence is not among the remedies available 
under the SCA.  Two of our sister circuits have so held.  See 
Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 890; United States v. Guerrero, 768 
F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014).  In light, however, of our 
holding that the government’s application satisfied the SCA, 
we need not and do not reach this question. 
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RFRA, we exercise plenary review.53  RFRA proscribes 
government conduct which “substantially burden[s] a 
person’s exercise of religion” unless the government can 
demonstrate, inter alia, that the burden is the “least restrictive 
means of furthering [a] compelling government interest.”54  
This proscription extends to the government’s criminal 
prosecutions under laws of general applicability; a defendant 
“may raise RFRA as a shield in the hopes of beating back the 
government’s charge.”55  The party invoking RFRA bears the 
initial burden of making out a prima facie case by showing 
that (1) it possesses a sincerely held religious belief, and (2) 
the government’s conduct substantially burdened that belief.56  
The burden then switches to the government to demonstrate 
that its conduct is the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling interest.57 
1. 
 We agree with the District Court’s holding that the 
defendants failed to satisfy their burden of establishing that 
the government substantially burdened their religious beliefs 
by prosecuting them for kidnapping.  While the government’s 
decision to prosecute the defendants undoubtedly constituted 
a burden on their sincerely held religious beliefs, the District 
                                              
53 See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao 
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
55 United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
56 Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 330 (5th Cir. 2013); 
see also Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173, 
176 (3d Cir. 1999). 
57 Tagore, 735 F.3d at 330; Adams, 170 F.3d at 176. 
24 
 
Court properly analyzed whether the burden was “substantial” 
by looking to acceptable alternative means of religious 
practice that remained available to the defendants.58  Here, 
none of the defendants argue that they are unable to 
participate in the mitzvah of liberating agunot without 
engaging in kidnapping; as the District Court noted, “it is 
unclear whether all non-violent methods were exhausted 
before the alleged kidnappings took place here.”59  The 
defendants do not challenge this determination on appeal.  As 
the defendants have failed to demonstrate that the prosecution 
was a “substantial” burden, we will affirm the District Court’s 
holding that prosecution under the federal kidnapping statute 
did not violate RFRA. 
 
 Moreover, even if the defendants had demonstrated 
that the government’s actions constituted a substantial burden 
on their religious exercise, we would nonetheless affirm the 
District Court’s determination that the government has a 
compelling interest in uniform application of laws about 
violent crimes and that no other effective means of such 
uniformity existed.  The Supreme Court has advised that the 
government’s interest in preventing serious crimes “is both 
legitimate and compelling.”60  The defendants fail to cite, nor 
can we identify, any cases in which any court has allowed 
RFRA to shield individuals in the commission of violent 
crimes. 
                                              
58 We have previously examined the adequacy of alternative 
means of practice in determining whether a religious burden 
is “substantial.”  See, e.g., Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 
282-83 (3d Cir. 2007). 
59 Epstein I, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 582. 
60 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). 
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 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s denial 
of the motion to dismiss the indictment. 
 
2. 
We turn next to the argument raised only by Stimler 
that his joinder with Epstein and Goldstein constituted an 
independent RFRA violation.  No court appears to have 
answered the question of whether RFRA imposes further 
limits on the government’s ability to structure a prosecution.  
The Supreme Court has noted that RFRA requires only that 
an individual face “serious disciplinary action”61 for acting on 
their religious beliefs.  This phrase encompasses sanctions 
short of prosecution.  However, Stimler’s briefing fails to 
suggest that the joinder itself was any kind of sanction, nor 
does it suggest that the joinder caused any burden on his 
religious exercise; instead, it focuses entirely on whether the 
prosecution itself worked a unique burden on Stimler’s 
religious practice.  Thus, we need not determine the exact 
boundaries of RFRA here, as Stimler has not adequately 
alleged that joinder violated his rights under RFRA. 
 
C. 
 All three defendants challenge the District Court’s 
decision under Rules 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of 
                                              
61 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (second 
alteration in original).  Although Holt dealt with a claim 
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA), the Supreme Court has stated that RLUIPA 
“imposes the same general test as RFRA . . ..”  Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014).  
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Evidence to bar admission of evidence about Orthodox 
Jewish marital law and the religious motivations for the 
kidnappings, arguing that such evidence was relevant to 
negating the specific intent required for conviction.  
Alternatively, the defendants argue that evidence of Orthodox 
Jewish laws about marital duties would be relevant to 
showing that the husbands consented to the kidnappings.  We 
review a district court’s exclusion of evidence for an abuse of 
discretion, but review de novo its interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.62 
 
 In relevant part, the federal kidnapping statute requires 
that the kidnapping be committed “for ransom or reward or 
otherwise . . ..”63  The District Court properly read this 
language as encompassing a broad set of potential motives, 
including the religious benefit of performing a mitzvah, while 
reasoning, however, “that religious motivation simply cannot 
negate the intent to commit a crime.”64  We agree that a 
religious benefit can constitute a “benefit” under the statute. 
 
 We will also affirm the District Court’s determination 
that the evidence of religious practices was not relevant to the 
affirmative defense of consent.  The defendants argue that, by 
practicing Orthodox Judaism and signing a marriage contract, 
the husbands consented to any use of force authorized by any 
beth din.  The District Court properly rejected this argument, 
reasoning that “[w]hile consent can be a defense to 
kidnapping, it has to be specific and cannot be prospective in 
                                              
62 Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
63 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
64 Epstein I, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 595. 
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nature.”65  The defendants do not argue that the religious 
evidence would demonstrate that the husbands gave specific 
consent to their particular kidnappings; accordingly, we agree 
that the religious evidence was not relevant to the affirmative 
defense. 
 
 We further agree with the District Court that any 
marginal relevance that the religious evidence may have had 
was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact it 
would have had on the trial.  Suggesting that the defendants 
acted for a religious purpose might have given rise to the 
potential for jury nullification, which we have held is 
substantially prejudicial.66 
 
 Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s decision under Rules 402 and 403 to exclude 
evidence about Orthodox Jewish marital law. 
 
D. 
We next turn to the argument, raised by Epstein and 
Goldstein, that the District Court erred in three respects in 
charging the jury.  First, they argue that the District Court 
failed to include the jurisdictional element of the kidnapping 
offense in the conspiracy instruction.  Second, they contend 
that the District Court erred in refusing to charge the jury that 
kidnapping requires the victim to be held for an appreciable 
                                              
65 Id. 
66 See United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 566 (3d Cir. 
2012) (finding that it was not abuse of discretion to exclude 
evidence that “had the potential for confusion and opened the 
door to jury nullification.”). 
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period of time.  Finally, the defendants claim that the District 
Court’s instruction as to motive constituted a constructive 
amendment of the indictment inasmuch as it did not include 
the specific religious motives charged in the indictment.  
Because the defendants did not object in the District Court, 
our review is for plain error.   
 
A district judge’s failure to instruct the jury as to a 
necessary element of the offense “ordinarily constitutes plain 
error”67 unless the instructions as a whole make clear to the 
jury all necessary elements of the offense.68  In determining 
whether there has been a plain error in jury instructions, we 
“consider the totality of the instructions . . ., not focusing on a 
particular paragraph in isolation.”69  Finally, even if the 
instructions omitted a necessary element in a way that would 
confuse the jury, we may nonetheless affirm if “no reasonable 
jury could find that the element was not present.”70 
 
We see no merit in the claim that the District Court 
failed to make clear the interstate commerce element in 
instructing the jury on the conspiracy charge.  While the 
conspiracy charge included no explicit jurisdictional 
                                              
67 United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 
2004) (quoting United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d 
Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in original). 
68 See, e.g., United States v. De Lazo, 497 F.2d 1168, 1171 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1974). 
69 United States v. Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531, 539 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1995)). 
70 United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citation omitted). 
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requirement, it did state that the jury would have to find that 
the defendants conspired to engage in “kidnapping, as alleged 
in the indictment.”71  The parties agree that the District Court 
included this element in the instructions as to the substantive 
kidnapping counts and in the indictment.  We therefore 
conclude that the instructions as a whole made clear that the 
conspiracy charge required the jury to find a conspiracy to 
commit a kidnapping that would cross state lines. 
 
We similarly decline to find error in the District 
Court’s decision to not include a temporal element in the 
kidnapping instruction.  Seizing on just one line in Chatwin v. 
United States, the defendants argue that federal kidnapping 
requires holding the victim “for an appreciable period.”72  We 
do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to create a 
new limit on kidnapping liability—one not found anywhere in 
the statutory text—in one line of dictum.  Further, as the 
government properly notes, we have upheld jury instructions 
that do not refer to any temporal limit on kidnapping liability 
even after Chatwin.73  Indeed, we have upheld convictions 
when an individual was held for mere minutes.74  Moreover, 
even if we were to see merit in the defendants’ assertions on 
this point, we would nonetheless affirm.  No reasonable juror 
                                              
71 R. 4123a. 
72 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946). 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 750 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
74 Cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Ventura, 775 F.2d 92, 
96 (3d Cir. 1985).  In fact, Ventura dealt with the Virgin 
Islands aggravated kidnapping statute, under which we have 
expressly held that we must consider “the duration of the 
detention.”  Id. at 95 (citation omitted).       
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would have failed to find that the seizure, blindfolding and 
coercion by the defendants did not involve holding for “an 
appreciable period.”  
 
Finally, the District Court did not constructively 
amend the indictment because, in instructing the jury, it 
actually did include the specific motive charged in the 
indictment.  The defendants assert that the indictment alleged 
that the defendants’ motive was “to threaten and coerce 
Jewish husbands to give gets to their wives.”75  The District 
Court expressly stated in its instructions that “[t]he indictment 
alleges the defendants had a purpose of holding the individual 
victims to coerce them into giving a get to the victim’s 
wife.”76  In light of this instruction, and the entirety of the 
evidence produced at trial, we cannot say that there is any 
“substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted the 
defendant for an offense differing from the offense the 
indictment . . . actually charged.” 77   
 
Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ challenges to 
the District Court’s jury instructions. 
 
E. 
Stimler and Goldstein next argue that the District 
Court improperly responded to a question from the jury on 
the third day of deliberations.  The jury asked the District 
Court whether “element #1 of kidnapping”—the “seizes, 
                                              
75 R. 174a. 
76 R. 4128a. 
77 United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(emphasis added). 
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confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away 
and holds” requirement—could be satisfied “[i]f you know 
that someone is being confined against their will and . . . do 
not intervene . . ..”78  The District Court responded that it 
“interpreted [the] question as referring to the kidnapping 
counts, counts 2 and 3.  If that is accurate, then the answer to 
[the] question is no.”79  The court further told the jury that if 
they were “inquiring about any other count, please so 
indicate, so that I may more fully consider [the] question and 
answer appropriately.”80  Stimler objected to this response, 
asserting that it suggested that the conspiracy count could be 
satisfied by failure to intervene.  Because Stimler properly 
objected to the response, we conduct plenary review.81  If we 
determine that the response was improper, we nonetheless 
may affirm if the error was harmless.82 
 
We do not agree that the District Court’s response 
improperly suggested that liability could be found upon a 
failure to intervene.  The District Court expressly stated that it 
was speaking only to the substantive kidnapping counts, and 
suggested nothing about the other counts, noting that it would 
need to “more fully consider [the] question” to “answer 
appropriately” if the jurors had questions about the other 
counts.  Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s 
response to the jury’s question. 
 
                                              
78 R. 4853a. 
79 R. 4854a. 
80 Id. 
81 United States v. Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted). 
82 Id. 
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F. 
 Goldstein and Epstein next challenge the admission of 
certain statements made by alleged co-conspirators, arguing 
that the statements were inadmissible hearsay under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and violated the Confrontation 
Clause.  While we “review a nonconstitutional challenge to 
the admission of hearsay for abuse of discretion,” we 
“exercise plenary review over Confrontation Clause 
challenges.”83  In distinguishing when to review admission of 
evidence under the Confrontation Clause from when to 
review under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the touchstone 
of our inquiry is “whether the contested statement by an out-
of-court declarant qualifies as testimonial . . ..”84  “[W]here 
nontestimonial hearsay is concerned, the Confrontation 
Clause has no role to play in determining the admissibility of 
a declarant’s statement.”85  A statement is testimonial only if 
it meets two requirements:  (1) it is a “solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact;”86 and (2) it was made primarily for the purpose of 
“prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”87  If the contested statement is testimonial, we 
                                              
83 United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
84 Id. at 127. 
85 Id. at 126. 
86 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) 
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). 
87 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ohio v. Clark, 
135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (formalizing two-part inquiry). 
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next must determine “if the defendant had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine [the declarant].”88 
 
The statements at issue were testified to by Aryeh 
Ralbag, another rabbi involved in the kidnapping ring.  At 
trial, Ralbag described the statements made before a beth din 
which was convened when the alleged victim of one of the 
charged kidnappings had challenged the validity of the get he 
signed.  Ralbag and two other rabbis presided at the beth din, 
and four witnesses—including Goldstein and Stimler—
testified that Goldstein and Stimler had served as eid in 
procuring the contested get.89   
 
We have no trouble concluding that these statements 
were not testimonial within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment.  It is clear that none of the individuals at the 
beth din—all of whom were charged as part of the 
conspiracy—would have reasonably believed that they were 
making statements for the purpose of assisting a criminal 
prosecution.  Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause is 
inapplicable to defendants’ challenge, and we only analyze 
whether the statements were inadmissible hearsay under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.90 
                                              
88 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008). 
89 The other two witnesses, and Ralbag himself, were arrested 
and charged as part of the kidnapping ring.  Ralbag was 
granted immunity in exchange for his testimony, and the 
other two witnesses pled guilty to lesser offenses. 
90 We therefore decline to consider whether the defendants 
had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the two other 
witnesses at the beth din, an issue which neither the 
defendants nor the government has briefed. 
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Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence explains 
that a statement is not hearsay if “the statement is offered 
against an opposing party and . . . was made by the party’s 
coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 91  
The Rule thus imposes two predicate inquiries before a 
statement will be admitted:  (1) the statement must be made 
by a coconspirator,92 and (2) the statement must be made 
during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.  
Both requirements must be satisfied by a preponderance of 
the evidence.93  Goldstein and Epstein assert that neither 
requirement was met here.  We disagree.  The fact that the 
two other individuals were present at the warehouse as part of 
the kidnapping team, coupled with their knowledge of the 
other kidnappings, was sufficient to demonstrate that they 
were indeed coconspirators.94  Similarly, because the purpose 
of the conspiracy was broadly to secure valid gittin from 
husbands, statements by coconspirators to prove the validity 
of the gittin were clearly made during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, regardless of when they were 
                                              
91 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 
92 A declarant will be considered a “coconspirator” whenever 
a conspiracy existed between the declarant and the party 
against whom the statement is offered.  See United States v. 
Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1360 (3d Cir. 1991). 
93 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987). 
94 The mere fact that the two other individuals were allowed 
to plead to violations of other statutes does not persuade us 
otherwise; prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding what 
to charge and what pleas to accept.  See Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackman, J., 
dissenting). 
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occurred.95  We thus find no error, constitutional or 
otherwise, in the District Court’s decision to admit the 
statements made at the beth din. 
 
Even if we were to assume that the statements were 
improperly admitted, however, we would nonetheless affirm 
because any error was harmless. 96  As noted, Ralbag testified 
as to statements made by four witnesses, including Goldstein 
and Stimler.  The defendants do not challenge the admission 
of the statements they themselves made, which largely 
paralleled those of the other two witnesses; the statements of 
the other two witnesses, therefore, were largely duplicative, 
and any error in their admission was harmless.97  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
properly admitted the evidence. 
                                              
95 See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 507 F.3d 178, 185-87 
(3d Cir. 2007) (holding that statements made after the core 
acts of the conspiracy were committed were in furtherance of 
the conspiracy insofar as they were made to conceal the 
unlawful acts). 
96 See United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 774, 776 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (noting that harmless error 
review applies to both admission of hearsay evidence and 
violations of Confrontation Clause, although the harmless 
error inquiry under the Federal Rules of Evidence is a 
“slightly less onerous standard”). 
97 Cf. DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 564-65 (noting that exclusion of 
duplicative evidence is well within the discretion of a trial 
judge). 
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G. 
 Stimler next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
against him.  We employ a “particularly deferential standard 
of review” to appeals challenging the sufficiency of evidence 
presented to the jury.98  In examining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we should not “weigh the evidence or . . . determine 
the credibility of witnesses.”99  Rather, the defendant bears 
the “very heavy burden” of showing that no rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.100 
 
 Stimler has failed to meet this burden.  The 
government presented uncontested evidence that Stimler was 
present at the site of the proposed kidnapping, and wore a 
disguise.  The government next introduced evidence that 
Stimler performed countersurveillance by walking around the 
warehouse with a flashlight.  On appeal, Stimler presents an 
alternative explanation of these facts.  Simply disagreeing 
with the jury’s interpretation of the facts, however, is 
insufficient.  We believe that the jury made a reasonable 
inference in finding that Stimler knew of the conspiracy and 
took affirmative steps to help carry it out.  We therefore 
affirm his conviction. 
                                              
98 United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
99 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
100 Id. (citation omitted). 
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H. 
 Finally, all three defendants challenge the FBI’s sting 
operation as conduct so outrageous that it violated due 
process.  This claim is procedurally barred, as the defendants 
failed to make the argument in the District Court, despite full 
knowledge of the scope of the government’s investigation.  
Nor do the defendants identify any new information that 
supports their claim of outrageous government conduct.  We 
have made clear that such failure waives challenges to 
allegedly outrageous government conduct.101 
 
 Moreover, even if this argument had been preserved, 
we would see no merit to it.  In reviewing claims of 
outrageous government conduct, we “repeatedly have noted 
that we are ‘extremely hesitant to find law enforcement 
conduct so offensive that it violates the Due Process 
Clause.’”102  We have rejected the argument that the 
government’s invitation to engage in criminal activity rises to 
this level where, as here, the defendants used their own 
knowledge and connections to set up and carry out the 
unlawful conduct.103  We have suggested that “the supply of 
ingredients” to commit a crime would be insufficient to meet 
                                              
101 United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 350 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
102 United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 154 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1065 (3d 
Cir. 1996)). 
103 United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
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this standard.104  Given that Epstein first suggested the use of 
violence, and that the defendants assembled the kidnapping 
team, chose a location, and acquired their own tools, we see 
no due process violation here. 
 
IV. 
 In our legal system, “liberty and social stability 
demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views 
of all citizens . . ..”105  Respect for religious beliefs cannot, 
however, trump all other legitimate, and sometimes 
competing, government objectives.  This appeal asks us to 
clarify the balance between religious freedom and public 
safety.  The balance here clearly lies on the side of public 
safety.  For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s convictions of Mendel Epstein, Jay 
Goldstein, and Binyamin Stimler. 
  
 
                                              
104 See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
105 McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties 
Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
1 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment. 
 
 I join parts I, II, III(A)(1), and III(B)-(H) of the 
Opinion of the Court, which address the parties’ arguments 
concerning the application of the third party doctrine to 
historical cell site location information (“CSLI”); applications 
of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb et seq., to discretionary trial procedure decisions of 
the District Court; introduction of evidence about Orthodox 
Jewish law; propriety of jury instructions and the District 
Court’s response to jury questions; admission of co-
conspirator statements; sufficiency of evidence; and 
outrageous government conduct.  However, I concur only in 
the judgment with respect to parts III(A)(2)-(3), because I 
believe that the Government obtaining 57 days of aggregated 
CSLI with only a § 2703(d) order supported by reasonable 
suspicion is, in this case, a warrantless search that violates the 
Fourth Amendment.  I depart from the Majority because of 
two Supreme Court opinions that have issued since our own 
Court last considered this issue. 
 
I 
 
 “[T]he holding of a panel in a precedential opinion”—
such as that in our Court’s most recent opinion on law 
enforcement requests for CSLI, In the Matter of the 
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose 
Records to the Government, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In 
re Application”)—“is binding on subsequent panels.”  Third 
Circuit I.O.P. 9.1.  This rule exists for good reason: it 
maintains uniformity of law within the Circuit, and promotes 
2 
predictability for litigants.  However, if Supreme Court 
authority abrogates or calls existing Circuit precedent into 
question, our Court has recognized that subsequent panels 
may decline to follow the prior holding without reconsidering 
the issue en banc.  George Harms Constr. Co., Inc. v. Chao, 
371 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Reich v. D.M. 
Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996).  
 
 This exception to our Internal Operating Procedures is 
narrow.  When our Court has declined to follow past 
precedent on the basis of intervening Supreme Court 
authority, we typically have declined to follow only the 
specific portions of the prior precedent that the intervening 
authority has called into question or abrogated.  United States 
v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 207 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009); see also 
Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 
F.3d 462, 467-68 (3d Cir. 2011).  I agree with the Majority 
that the third party doctrine holding of In re Application has 
not been called into question by subsequent authority.  
However, I take a different view on the ongoing vitality of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in In re 
Application, in light of Supreme Court opinions in United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), and Riley v. California, 
134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014).   
 
  Jones and Riley have “sufficiently undercut the 
decisional basis” of In re Application’s holding that 
magistrate judges can issue a § 2703(d) order for aggregated 
location information, rather than requiring a warrant, in many 
instances.  West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1983).  In 
re Application held that magistrate judges could require a 
warrant for CSLI upon considering the individual surveillance 
target’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
3 
Amendment.  With the more recent guidance of Jones and 
Riley, I would conclude that in at least most factual 
circumstances—including those before us—magistrate judges 
must require a warrant for the aggregated collection of 
historical CSLI to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 In Jones, law enforcement officers surreptitiously 
placed a tracking device on the bumper of a surveillance 
target’s car without a valid warrant, and collected 28 days’ 
worth of global positioning system (“GPS”) location data.  
Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.  The lead opinion in Jones held that 
this conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because of the 
physical trespass committed.  Id. at 404-05.  In what has 
come to be regarded as the “shadow majority” of Jones,1 
however, five Justices in two concurrences disagreed with the 
reasoning of the lead opinion, which “disregards what is 
really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-
term tracking).”  Jones, 565 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(emphasis in original).  Those Justices found a constitutional 
privacy interest implicated by aggregated tracking of an 
individual’s location over time.  Id. at 430 (Alito, J., 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Application of the 
United States of America for an Order Authorizing 
Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Information for Telephone 
Number [Redacted], 40 F. Supp. 3d 89, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(rejecting a § 2703(d) application absent a showing of 
probable cause or more evidence about CSLI, because of 
“serious questions about whether the Fourth Amendment 
requires a warrant to obtain CSLI” in light of Jones). 
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concurring); id. at 413-14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).2  That 
reasonable expectation of privacy reflects the intrusion that 
occurs when the Government can aggregate enough location 
data on individuals to draw inferences about their private 
lives and constitutionally protected activities.  Id. at 416 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The concurrences place more 
weight on protecting the privacy interest itself, and, in 
particular, considering the aggregation of information 
obtained by the Government.  Id. at 426 (Alito, J., 
concurring); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 
 Historically, this interest has been protected in part by 
resource constraints facing law enforcement agencies—but 
those resource constraints no longer present an obstacle to 
this type of aggregation.  In the past, obtaining aggregated 
location information on any individual by tracking him or her 
“for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and 
therefore rarely undertaken.”  Id. at 429 (Alito, J., 
concurring).  Constant monitoring of an individual’s location 
is possible now, however, because of new technology 
“available at a relatively low cost.”  Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).  Those former 
resource constraints, however, have shaped what the Jones 
                                                 
2 Although the lead opinion in Jones resolved the case 
on the basis of physical trespass, it addressed the 
concurrences’ position that the trespass theory provided 
insufficient protection of an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy by acknowledging that “[i]t may be 
that achieving the same result through electronic means, 
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy.”  Jones, 565 U.S. at 412. 
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shadow majority recognized as a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Historically, “society’s expectation has been that 
law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in 
the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue 
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long 
period.”  Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 
  Here, in its § 2703(d) application to the Magistrate 
Judge, the Government requested location information for 57 
total days.  Such a quantity of location information prompts 
exactly the question Justice Sotomayor posed in Jones: 
“whether people reasonably expect that their movements will 
be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political 
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”  Jones, 565 
U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 419 
(Alito, J., concurring).  Five Justices in Jones would answer 
that question in the negative—at least as to aggregation 
exceeding “the 4-week mark.”  Id. at 430 (Alito, J., 
concurring); see also id at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 
 The Majority declines to read the Jones concurrences 
as undercutting “In re Application in any meaningful way” in 
part “because of the different technologies at issue.”  Maj. 
Op. 15.  To the extent that tracking an individual’s cell phone 
by CSLI and tracking an individual’s car by GPS differ, the 
privacy interest that protects an individual from the 
Government aggregating that location information (without a 
warrant) remains the same.  If anything, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in aggregated location derived from an 
individual’s use of a cell phone is stronger than the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in aggregated location 
derived from that same individual’s use of a car.  Aggregating 
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data points from cell phone location into a comprehensive 
record offers the Government more opportunity to infer 
things about an individual, because cell phones accompany 
individuals many places that cars do not.  “Historic location 
information . . . can reconstruct someone's specific 
movements down to the minute, not only around town but 
also within a particular building.”  Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2490.  
Moreover, cell phones accompany individuals who travel by 
public transit or otherwise not by car, regular drivers who 
temporarily rent a different car, and those who ride in the cars 
of others.  And regardless of how an individual moves 
through the world, “nearly three-quarters of smartphone users 
report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, 
with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the 
shower.”  Id.   
 
The Majority also reads the Jones shadow majority as 
not undercutting In re Application in part because of the 
distinction in precision between GPS data—at issue in 
Jones—and the CSLI at issue here.  This distinction has 
nearly disappeared since we decided In re Application.  By 
the time of the events at issue in this case, CSLI had grown 
quite precise, particularly in more densely-populated 
jurisdictions.3  In cities where wireless providers have more 
towers to provide service for more people packed into a given 
area, the identifiable radius in which a subscriber would 
                                                 
3 Because we consider the case on the facts before us, 
we consider CSLI as precise as it is in urban areas.  It may be 
that the less precise CSLI in rural areas is so dissimilar from 
GPS location data as to make Jones inapplicable, but we need 
not consider that question. 
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connect to one tower rather than another is substantially 
smaller.  In explaining this concept to the jury, the 
Government’s expert at trial noted that the layout of “tightly 
compacted towers in Brooklyn” “will reduce the coverage 
area of” any one tower.  App. 3494a.  The number of towers 
and antennas in Brooklyn, for instance, allowed the expert to 
note proximity to an antenna on “the side of a building near 
the intersection of Webster Avenue and . . . Coney Island 
Avenue.”  Id.  The expert also used CSLI to describe an 
individual’s “southbound movement on I-278.”  App. 3499a-
500a.   
 
By contrast, when the In re Application court 
considered this issue, CSLI did “not provide information 
about the location of the caller closer than several hundred 
feet.”  In re Application, 620 F.3d at 311.  Since then, 
wireless network improvements have included the 
distribution of “hundreds of thousands of ‘microcells,’ 
‘picocells,’ and ‘femtocells,’” which function similarly to 
hotspots and create CSLI that “can in some cases be more 
accurate than GPS.”  Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher 
Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable 
Standards For Law Enforcement Access To Location Data 
That Congress Could Enact, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 117, 132 
(2012).  Even the proliferation of traditional cell towers has 
resulted in smaller coverage areas and CSLI that is “far more 
accurate—in some cases as good as GPS.”  Id. at 133. 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy of an individual 
in an urban area in the aggregated location information of his 
or her CSLI is functionally indistinguishable from the 
reasonable expectation of privacy of that same individual in 
the aggregated location information of his or her GPS data.  
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Distinguishing Jones on the basis of the greater precision of 
GPS ignores the current capabilities of CSLI, and indeed, the 
use the Government made of it in this case. 
 
Although the Majority distinguishes Riley from the 
facts here by separating contents and metadata, Riley should 
inform our analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
in CSLI, as well.  The animating principle behind Riley is the 
same as the principle behind Jones: the Government may 
violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
when it obtains too much aggregated information without a 
warrant.  In Riley, decided two years after Jones, the 
aggregation at issue merely took a different form.  There, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the aggregation of data 
allowed by the increased capacity of digital storage helps law 
enforcement agents make inferences that intrude on an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  The Court 
held unconstitutional a warrantless search of a cell phone, in 
part because the types of information stored on the cell phone 
in question “reveal[ed] much more in combination than any 
isolated record.”  Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2489.   
 
The Riley Court rejected applications of doctrine 
created for older technologies that allowed for less 
aggregation of historically protected information.  The Court 
distinguished call logs on modern cell phones from pen 
registers in part on the basis that “call logs typically contain 
more than just phone numbers; they include any identifying 
information that an individual might add.”  Id. at 2493.  
While cataloguing the different types of data stored on cell 
phones that had not historically been stored on landline 
telephones, the Court explained that doctrines governing 
“qualitatively different” pre-digital counterparts do not 
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compare well to modern technology in considering questions 
of criminal procedure.  Id. at 2490, 2493.  Allowing 
warrantless collection by analogy to older technologies would 
instead cause “a significant diminution of privacy.”  Id. at 
2493.   
 
Here, technological changes since In re Application in 
the provision of wireless service mean that CSLI—like the 
phone itself, in Riley—conveys a greater quantity of 
information for the Government to aggregate than it did 
previously.  The Government’s application for CSLI 
encompassed more data points than merely the location at the 
time of incoming or outgoing telephone calls.  In requesting 
“[a]ll data about which ‘cell towers’ and ‘sectors’ received a 
radio signal from each cellular telephone or device assigned 
to the Account, including, but not limited to, per call 
management data or return Time from Tower data,” App. 459 
(emphasis added), the Government sought information that 
would allow for essentially continuous location tracking, 
rather than rare location snapshots.  AT&T, from which the 
government sought and obtained the information, collects 
CSLI data upon call “hand-offs,” which occur when a person 
moves while on a call, and the call switches to routing 
through the next tower (or a different face of the same tower) 
as the individual gets closer to it.  App. 3497a.  At trial, the 
Government’s expert was able to use hand-offs during a 
defendant’s 52-second call to describe the CSLI as 
“consistent with southbound movement on I-278” from New 
York to northern New Jersey.  App. 3499a-3500a.  Tracking 
an individual through space during the course of a call 
represents more data to aggregate—and a correspondingly 
greater privacy intrusion—than simply collecting his or her 
location only at the origination and termination of a call. 
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 The application also reflects the Government’s 
capability to obtain data from use of a cell phone that it could 
not typically have obtained from an individual’s use of a 
telephone, which the Riley Court regarded as a reason to 
require warrants for cell phone searches.  Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 
2489.  Here, the Government requested location information 
for text messages, as well.  Indeed, the Government’s request 
to AT&T may stretch even more broadly than calls and 
texts—asking for data about each time a tower “received a 
radio signal,” App. 459, from a phone could conceivably 
encompass any time any application on a phone, even one 
running passively in the background, connects to the network.  
In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a 
Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1024 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (affirming a magistrate judge’s denial of an 
application for CSLI under § 2703(d)).  CSLI may be 
generated by an action as innocuous as a user’s email 
application passively checking for mail in the background 
without an active request that it do so by the user.  Id.  
Collecting data at every radio signal—whether the origin or 
termination of a call, a call hand-off, a text message, or a data 
connection by an application—threatens an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy more than collecting data at 
the origination and termination of calls only. 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, I believe that the 
Government obtaining the quantity of historical CSLI it did in 
this case amounts to a search that, without a warrant, 
infringes on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
and violates the Fourth Amendment. 
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II 
 
 All of this said, I would not suppress the CSLI 
evidence in this case because of the good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement.  “Searches conducted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not 
subject to the exclusionary rule.”  United States v. Katzin, 769 
F.3d 163, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Davis v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231 (2011)).4  In re Application 
amounted to binding Circuit precedent that “specifically 
authorize[d the] particular police practice” at issue here.  
Davis, 564 U.S. at 241.  As such, the CSLI in this case need 
not have been excluded, and I concur with the Opinion of the 
Court as to the judgment on this issue. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The Opinion of the Court and the dissents in Katzin 
disagree as to how directly a prior case must authorize 
particular law enforcement conduct to amount to “binding 
appellate precedent” on which law enforcement officers could 
rely.  Compare Katzin, 769 F.3d at 174, with id. at 192-93 
(Greenaway, Jr., J., dissenting).  This case presents no such 
question of directness.  The Katzin dissents also pointed out 
that limiting the application of the exclusionary rule might 
lead to more occasions of law enforcement officers 
conducting searches not sanctioned by judges.  See id. at 189-
90 (Greenaway, Jr., J., dissenting).  Here, agents still sought 
out the imprimatur of a neutral magistrate judge for the search 
(albeit under a lesser standard than probable cause).  
12 
III 
 
Despite applying the good faith exception to the 
warrant requirement in this instance, I believe that obtaining 
historical CSLI that approaches GPS-level precision, 
aggregated over at least the four week period the Jones 
shadow majority rejected—as in this case—should require a 
warrant supported by probable cause rather than a § 2703(d) 
order supported by reasonable suspicion.  “Our cases have 
historically recognized that the warrant requirement is an 
important working part of our machinery of government, not 
merely an inconvenience to be somehow weighed against the 
claims of police efficiency.”  Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2493 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Especially where 
“[r]ecent technological advances . . . have . . . made the 
process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient,” we need 
not sanction the rapid pace and expansive scope of 
technological change eroding important constitutional 
protections that we have enjoyed for centuries.  Id.  “The 
[Fourth] Amendment and the common law from which it was 
constructed leave ample room for law enforcement to do its 
job.  A warrant will always do.”  U.S. v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 
988, 1015 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, I concur only as to the 
judgment in parts III(A)(2)-(3) of the Opinion of the Court. 
